The efficacy of macroeconomic policies in resolving

financial market disequilibria: A cross‐country analysis by Singh, Gurcharan et al.
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Singh, Gurcharan and Wilson, Albert and 
Halari, Anwar (2018) The efficacy of macroeconomic policies in resolving financial market 
disequilibria: A cross‐country analysis. International Journal of Financial Economics. ISSN 1099-1158], 
which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.1684. This article may be used for 
non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived 
Versions." 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Efficacy of Macroeconomic Policies in Resolving Financial Market Disequilibria: A 
Cross-Country Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Macroeconomic Policies, Financial Market, Disequilibria, Political Landscape, 
Global Financial Integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study attempts to evaluate the efficacy of macroeconomic policies in resolving financial 
market disequilibria and to elucidate the influence of the political landscape and global 
financial integration on the policymaking process. The current investigation examines three 
macroeconomic policies (i) government spending, (ii) liquidity provision and (iii) central bank 
interest rates by analysing 21 countries around the globe. The results suggest that government 
spending is a suboptimal macroeconomic policy for mitigating imbalances in financial markets, 
as it may have destabilizing effects. Liquidity provision was found to be ineffective in 
facilitating financial market stability whereas the adjustment of interest rates was found to be 
a viable tool for mitigating financial market imbalances. Therefore, an appropriate policy 
framework would comprise the following: prudent government spending, conditional liquidity 
provision and a reduction in interest rates following the development of financial market 
disequilibria. Furthermore, this study found strong evidence against the notion that political 
orientations influence policy frameworks which were designed to redress financial market 
disequilibria. This study also found that global financial integration does not influence the 
policymaking process.  
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1. Introduction  
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, policy frameworks designed to mitigate financial market 
disequilibria and economic downturns have been re-evaluated in an attempt to identify the role 
of macroeconomic policies in supplementing macroprudential regulation (Blanchard, et al., 
2012). A paradigm shift regarding conventional policy frameworks which focus on core 
economic objectives has occurred, with many countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan providing unorthodox support to financial systems through 
macroeconomic policies (Feenstra and Taylor, 2014). Given the dynamic and unpredictable 
nature of financial systems, the task of designing and implementing macroeconomic policies 
to resolve financial market disequilibria and stimulate economies is particularly challenging. 
Macroeconomic policies may also be subject to the influence of the political landscape and 
global financial integration, which may determine the choice and efficacy of these policies 
(Soare, 2013).  
 
The function of macroeconomic policies in resolving financial market disequilibria has 
undergone a certain degree of clarification in recent years (Blanchard, et al., 2012). Regarding 
fiscal policies, the use of government spending as a stabilisation tool in financial markets is 
typically given more credence than tax policies (Delong, et al., 2012). Bachmann and Sims 
(2012) postulated that increasing government expenditure fosters confidence within financial 
markets, which may alleviate any bottlenecks in the flow of funds and help redress financial 
market imbalances. However, Afonso and Sousa (2011) argued that government-spending 
shocks increase interest rates and displace consumption and investment.1 As for monetary 
policies, many studies such as Mishkin (2011) and Gali (2013) posited that a viable policy 
                                                     
1 This is known as the ‘crowding out’ effect as government-spending shocks utilise resources that are often limited 
during periods of financial market disequilibria or recessions (Auerback and Gorodnichenko, 2013).  
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framework to resolve financial market disequilibria includes providing liquidity2 and adjusting 
interest rates or repo rates.  Providing liquidity and reducing interest rates may alleviate the 
funding shortages of financial intermediaries, which increases lending activities and helps 
mitigate financial market disequilibria (Woodford, 2012). Other studies however argue the low 
interest rate policy and excess liquidity lead financial intermediaries to take excessive risks 
(Taylor, 2009). More specifically, Taylor (2009) criticises the monetary policies by central 
banks such as the US Federal Reserves that held interest rates too low for too long in the run 
up to the 2008 Financial Crisis. Hence, prior literature suggest that the primary macroeconomic 
policies used to resolve imbalances in financial markets may be government expenditure, 
liquidity provision and the adjustment of interest rates.   
 
Macroeconomic policies are subject to the influence of the political landscape, which may 
affect their efficacy in mitigating financial market disequilibria (Soare, 2013). The core 
objectives of macroeconomic policies are often determined by the political ideologies of 
governments and their electoral accountability (Fredriksson, et al., 2013). Rausser, et al (2011) 
Bjornskov and Potrafke (2012) postulated that political ideologies determine the urgency 
attributed to financial market and economic issues, as objective economic interests and 
subjective preferences vary across political orientations. Fundamental to the left-wing or liberal 
perspective is the significant role of governments in achieving distributive justice3 (Hayek, 
2012). Essentially, left-wing governments have a tendency to prioritise the reduction of 
unemployment, implementing macroeconomic policies primarily to restore economic stability, 
facilitate an equal distribution of income and property and prevent market abuse (Hutchison, 
                                                     
2 Central banks provide liquidity to financial intermediaries through open market operations. A paragon of 
liquidity provision is the Term Action Facility (TAF) implemented by the United States Federal Reserve which 
allows financial intermediaries in the United States to bid for sound short-term loans that have relatively low 
interest rates (Mishkin, 2011).  
3 Distributive justice refers to the fair distribution of goods and services throughout a society (Greenberg and 
Cohen, 2014).  
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2013). Conversely, proponents of the right-wing or conservative perspective oppose intrusive 
government intervention (Bjornskov and Potrafke, 2012). Right-wing governments have an 
inclination to pursue price stability, with unemployment being secondary in their 
macroeconomic objectives (Thompson, 2014). Hence, right-wing governments try to facilitate 
market solutions before intervening. Suffice to say, extremism in political ideologies is rare, as 
there tends to be some convergence across the political spectrum (Hutchison, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the political landscape generates profound interference throughout the 
policymaking process, determining the timing and choice of macroeconomic policies 
implemented to mitigate financial market imbalances (Soare, 2013). As such, the political 
landscape may influence the efficacy of macroeconomic stabilisation policies. 
 
Beyond the political landscape, the choice of macroeconomic policies is also influenced by 
global financial integration4 (Koenig, et al., 2010; Corbett and Xu, 2015). Notwithstanding the 
fact that global financial integration encourages the flow of funds, it also increases contagion 
or the exposure of financial systems to systemic risks (Corbett and Xu, 2015). Many studies 
such as Feenstra and Taylor (2014) and Karras (2014) argued that global financial integration 
increases policy spillovers5 between countries, and governments tend to respond to these 
externalities by implementing various macroeconomic policies. Moreover, the efficacy of 
macroeconomic policies may also be partially contingent on the degree of global financial 
integration (Mishkin, 2009). By increasing arbitrage opportunities, global financial integration 
may inhibit the real effects of expansionary fiscal policies (Mishkin, 2009). As for monetary 
policies, global financial integration reduces the ability of central banks to control market 
interest rates, intensifying the role of exchange rates as policy transmission mechanisms 
                                                     
4 Global financial integration refers to the interconnectedness of financial systems around the world (Corbett and 
Xu, 2015). 
5 Policy spillovers are instances where macroeconomic policies implemented in a particular country influence 
developments in another country (Karras, 2014).  
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(Gadanecz and Mehrotra, 2014). There has also been a growing consensus throughout the 
existing literature that global financial integration induces the coordination of macroeconomic 
policies across countries, led by a cohort of countries such as the Group of Seven (G7)6 
(Feenstra and Taylor, 2014). By impeding the efficacy of macroeconomic policies and 
potentially reducing the level of autonomy governments have in the policymaking process, 
global financial integration can influence the choice of macroeconomic policies that 
governments administer (Feenstra and Taylor, 2014). Thus, global financial integration may 
have significant implications on the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies implemented to 
resolve financial market disequilibria.  
 
The purpose of this study is to elucidate an effective macroeconomic policy framework for 
resolving financial market disequilibria, accounting for the influence of the political landscape 
and global financial integration on the choice of macroeconomic policies. As such, this study 
aims to (i) determine the efficacy of macroeconomic policies (government spending, liquidity 
provision and central bank interest rates) in resolving imbalances in financial markets; (ii)  
ascertain whether or not political orientations influence the policymaking process in terms of 
the choice of macroeconomic policies implemented to resolve financial market disequilibria7; 
and (iii) elucidate the influence of global financial integration on the choice of macroeconomic 
policies aimed to resolve financial market disequilibria. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Literature on macroeconomic policies has begun to transcend the notion that macroeconomic 
policies should primarily be implemented to minimise the amplitude of the general economic 
                                                     
6 The G7 or Group of Seven is a bloc consisting of strong industrial countries, namely Canada, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Japan (Taylor, 2013).   
7 Regarding the influence of political orientations, this study only considers the three main political orientations 
rather than the entire political spectrum. 
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cycle. Various studies have highlighted the significance of macroeconomic policies relative to 
resolving financial market disequilibria. Recent studies revolve around the debate on whether 
or not macroeconomic policies should be implemented to redress financial market imbalances. 
 
Three cardinal perspectives originate from the emergence of the significance of 
macroeconomic policies, which are that macroeconomic policies should be either proactive, or 
reactive or neutral in nature. A fundamental feature of theories that advocate proactive 
macroeconomic policies is the notion that financial market disequilibria can be identified. 
Studies such Yurichuk (2010) and Schwaab et al. (2013) argue that preventative measures 
should be implemented since financial market disequilibria can be identified. Proponents of 
proactive macroeconomic stabilisation policies also argue that there is an inherent lag in 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies, which necessitates more pre-emptive measures 
(Kobayashi, 2013; Stoian, 2014). Studies have also investigated the financial market conditions 
necessary for macroeconomic policies to be implemented (Bask, 2012; Gwilym, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, studies rooted in this perspective argue that alternative measures such as 
macroprudential regulation, though less invasive than macroeconomic policies, are ineffective 
in resolving financial market disequilibria (Evanoff, et al., 2012). Based on the premise that 
volatility in one market can induce panic in another market, Liang et al. (2012) analysed the 
interaction between different financial market imbalances. Liang et al. (2012) concluded that 
macroprudential regulation does not adequately restore market fundamentals or impede 
information-induced panic, which may perpetuate financial market imbalances.  
 
Contrary to proactive macroeconomic policy advocates, proponents of reactive 
macroeconomic policies argue that financial market disequilibria cannot be easily identified. 
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Posen (2011) argued that conventional indicators of financial market imbalances such as credit 
growth are not robust and may not capture financial market disequilibria. Moreover, König and 
Pothier (2015) added that contemporary models do not provide easily measurable and 
unequivocal indicators that policymakers can use. Hence, with the inherent difficulty in 
identifying financial market dislocations, policy frameworks may not be effective. Many 
studies have also argued that reactive macroeconomic stabilisation policies effectively resolve 
financial market disequilibria with little externalities (Junevicius and Justinaviciene, 2010).  
 
Gali (2013) suggested that proactive monetary policies such as raising interest rates during the 
formation of financial market disequilibria are counterproductive because financial market 
volatility may increase as a result.8 Yao et al. (2013) augmented the propositions of Gali (2013) 
and concluded that the effectiveness of monetary policies in resolving financial market 
disequilibria in the short-run depends on investor behaviour.9 These studies suggest that 
proactive macroeconomic stabilisation policies may be too impulsive and reactive 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies may be less invasive and more effective.  
 
Prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis, many studies such as Bernanke et al. (1999) postulated that 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies aimed at resolving financial market imbalances were 
unnecessary.10 Years later, Kuttner (2012) postulated that macroprudential regulation is pivotal 
in resolving financial market imbalances and facilitating financial market stability. Acharya 
and Naqvi (2012) augmented this proposition and concluded that macroprudential regulation 
                                                     
8 Studies such as Taylor (2009), however, argue that low interest rates may have set the stage for the 2008 Financial 
Crisis. 
9 For instance, irrational investors may trade against macroeconomic policies (Yao, et al., 2013; Hanson and Stein, 
2015). Other key studies such as Driffill (2013) and Huang and Yeh (2015) argued that systematic fiscal policies 
are more effective than monetary policies such as quantitative easing which may hinder financial market stability 
by increasing the risk exposure of central banks. 
10 This was primarily due to the fact that a common facet of the mandate of monetary authorities is to ensure price 
stability, which was thought to facilitate financial stability (Bernanke et al., 1999). 
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should aim to reduce excess liquidity since excessive leveraging is the primary driver of 
financial market imbalances. However, both Kuttner (2012) and Acharya and Naqvi (2012) 
disregarded the fact that reducing liquidity may lead to liquidity hoarding in the financial 
system, which causes inefficiency in financial markets. Studies have also given credence to the 
notion that limited financial knowledge and lack of experience are instrumental factors in the 
formation of financial market imbalances (Emmons and Noeth, 2013; Cason and Samek, 2014). 
 
Thus, these three perspectives on macroeconomic stabilisation policies have been the locus of 
recent literature, most notably in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis. Each perspective 
advocates different policy responses to financial market disequilibria. Suffice to say, 
policymakers can use an amalgam of these perspectives as each has its own merit. 
Nevertheless, these perspectives articulate the significance of implementing a mixture of 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies and macroprudential regulation to effectively redress 
financial market disequilibria.  Based on this analysis, we set out our first four hypotheses (in 
their alternative form) as follows:  
H1: Government spending does not significantly mitigate imbalances in financial markets. 
H2: Government spending effectively stimulates GDP, consumption and investment and 
reduces market interest rates. 
H3: Liquidity provision does not significantly resolve financial market disequilibria. 
H4: Lowering central bank interest rates promotes stability in financial markets during periods 
of disequilibrium. 
 
2.1 The Influence of the Political Landscape 
A predominant strand of literature on the political economy is the determinants of the political 
landscape. Studies such as Rausser et al (2011) have postulated that the inherent economic 
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interests and subjective preferences of different political orientations have a direct bearing on 
whether governments are proactive, neutral, or reactive in trying to mitigate financial market 
imbalances. As such, political orientations may influence the policy frameworks of 
governments during financial market disequilibria.  
 
Many studies have analysed the influence of political orientations on the implementation of 
macroeconomic policies (Song, 2010; Crawford, 2011 and Samuels and Shugart, 2011). Song 
(2010) suggests that left-wing governments are proactive in resolving financial market 
disequilibria while right-wing governments are more reactive. Centrist governments evaluate 
the trade-off between ignoring financial market and responding to financial market imbalances. 
However, the preferences of various political orientations are not necessarily absolute, as 
Samuels and Shugart (2011) argued that financial market instability or economic recessions 
might cause policy convergence. 
 
Another field of inquiry is the evaluation of the effects of market failures on the political 
landscape (Perez and Westrup, 2008). For example, Hayford and Malliaris (2008) posited that 
the political landscape sets constraints for macroeconomic stabilisation policies.11 Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2013) offer contrasting insights in their analysis of economic policy advice, 
arguing that the policymaking process often excludes politics because of the exclusive focus 
of policymakers on resolving financial market disequilibria. Nevertheless, these studies 
accentuated the relationship amongst financial market disequilibria, the political landscape, and 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies.  
                                                     
11 Perez and Westrup (2008) argued that elected governments have an inclination to implement macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies and macroprudential regulation that limit their exposure or political costs rather than policy 
frameworks that are more optimal. Based on this premise, Hayford and Malliaris (2008) suggested that it is 
unlikely that monetary authorities will be able to increase interest rates only to prevent financial market 
dislocations. 
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Thus, literature on the influence of the political landscape on macroeconomic policies surpasses 
the rudimentary contention that the political landscape is significant. Key fields of inquiry 
include the determinants of the political landscape, the influence of political orientations on the 
implementation of macroeconomic policies and the effects of market failure on the political 
landscape. The political landscape is a pivotal factor in designing policy frameworks to 
mitigate financial market disequilibria. Hence, we develop our next three hypothesis:  
H5: Left-wing governments are more proactive than right-wing governments in redressing 
financial market disequilibria.  
H6: Centrist governments have an inclination to implement macroeconomic policies in order 
to resolve imbalances in financial markets.   
H7: Financial market disequilibria cause policy convergence across political ideologies. 
 
2.2 The Influence of Global Financial Integration 
There is a growing consensus in recent literature that global financial integration significantly 
influences the macroeconomic policy framework chosen to mitigate imbalances in financial 
markets (Thurston and Bowen, 2011). Prasad et al. (2003) alluded to the fact that global 
financial integration has a significant impact on macroeconomic policies. Other studies (Kose, 
et al., 2006; Vo and Daly, 2007) have contended that the effects of financial global integration 
on the macroeconomic policy framework of countries depends on the level of domestic 
financial market development, the quality of corporate governance, macroeconomic policy 
regimes and the degree of trade liberalisation. The central idea of these studies is that global 
financial integration influences the implementation of macroeconomic policies. For example, 
Correa and Girón (2013) argued that the degree of global financial integration determines the 
effect of foreign macroeconomic policies on capital flows, and domestic dependence on these 
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capital flows influences the severity of macroeconomic policies. In addition, Pierre (2015) 
argued that global financial integration is a primary driver of market deregulation, redefining 
the ultimate objectives and tools of macroeconomic policies.  
 
Another strand of literature focuses on the measures to control global financial integration. At 
the locus of this strand of literature is the notion that globalisation, in general, restricts the 
autonomy of countries relative to their macroeconomic policy framework and increases 
vulnerability to global financial risks (Rodrik, 2012; Fratzscher, 2012; Goldberg, 2013). For 
example, Ahmed and van Hulten (2014) and Obstfeld (2015) posited that macroeconomic 
policies such as flexible exchange rates could be used to control global financial integration. 
These studies contributed to the literature by elucidating various measures to reduce the effects 
of global financial integration and provide insulation from potential financial and monetary 
shocks.  
 
In summary, global financial integration, like the political landscape, is instrumental in the 
implementation of macroeconomic stabilisation policies. As such, policymakers should 
consider the degree of global financial integration when formulating macroeconomic policies 
aimed at resolving financial market disequilibria. On this basis, we develop our final four 
hypothesis:  
H8: Global financial integration does not significantly influence government spending during 
periods of financial market disequilibria. 
H9: Global financial integration leads governments to implement liquidity provision as a 
financial market stabilisation tool. 
H10: The adjustment of central bank interest rates is significantly influenced by global financial 
integration.   
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H11: Global financial integration causes policy harmonisation across countries during periods 
of financial market disequilibria.  
 
It is clear that recent literature has not sufficiently explicated the strategic use of 
macroeconomic policies to remedy financial market disequilibria (Blanchard, et al., 2012). 
Until recently, fiscal policies were regarded as secondary within the macroeconomic policy 
framework to stabilise imbalances within the financial market, primarily due to the time needed 
to formulate appropriate policies and the lags involved with their implementation (Feenstra and 
Taylor, 2014). Further analyses could expound on whether or not government expenditure 
dovetails with monetary policies as a stabilisation policy (Bachmann and Sims, 2012). Relative 
to monetary policies, there is insufficient research regarding the efficacy of liquidity provision 
and adjustments of central bank interest rates in resolving financial market disequilibria, 
specifically across a wide variety of countries which have different monetary policy capacities 
(Woodford, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, examinations of the political landscape have not adequately delineated its 
influence on the policymaking process during periods of financial market disequilibria 
(Bjornskov and Potrafke, 2010).  There is ambiguity regarding the policy tools which left-wing, 
centrist and right-wing governments are inclined to implement in order to resolve imbalances 
in financial markets (Woodford, 2012; Hutchison, 2013). Moreover, the notion of policy 
convergence across political orientations during periods of financial market disequilibria needs 
further empirical support (Hutchison, 2013). In addition, key studies on global financial 
integration typically examine the United States, the European Union (EU) or the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The current study will add to the existing strand of 
literature by conducting further empirical work concerning the influence of the political 
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landscape and global integration on the policymaking process. Furthermore, this study will add 
to existing literature on global financial integration by considering countries that are not 
necessarily members of formal or informal blocs or alliances.  Thus, this study will investigate 
policy framework for resolving financial market disequilibria taking account of the influence 
of the political landscape and global financial integration.   
 
3. Data and Method 
This study analyses developed and developing countries with strong financial markets, where 
governments are likely to implement macroeconomic policies to facilitate financial market 
stability (Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2012). Based on a report published by the World Economic 
Forum (2012), the following twenty-one countries were selected: the United Kingdom, 
Australia, the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Norway, 
Malaysia, South Korea, China, South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, Germany, France, Sweden, 
Austria, Netherlands and Poland. Data is collected from various sources12 and Datastream. The 
analyses on these countries were conducted over the period from 1994 to 2015. This period is 
chosen because it avoids significant structural breaks in the data resulting from the formal 
establishment of the EU in November 1993, as a few of the selected countries are members of 
the EU. In addition, this period captures key financial market imbalances, such as the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, the Dotcom Bubble and the 2008 Financial Crisis.  The study uses 
quarterly data since macroeconomic policies are implemented quarterly or annually. 
Furthermore, quarterly data avoids any under-parametisation problems that may result from 
using annual data for the period of this analysis. 
 
                                                     
12 Sources include Oxford Economics, the Office of National Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 
OECD, Election Resources, Thomson Reuters, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the central banks or monetary authorities of each country.  
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3.1 Identifying Financial Market Imbalances 
In order to identify financial market disequilibria, credit spreads will be used as a proxy based 
on the propositions of Jones (2014) and Krishnamurthy and Muir (2015) as they capture the 
general equilibrium of multiple financial markets. Although credit spreads reflect the general 
equilibrium of financial markets, other proxies are also identified in literature. More 
specifically, three primary proxies for identifying financial market imbalances have emerged 
through existing literature, namely credit spreads, sovereign bond yield spreads and 
government debt-to-GDP ratios. Credit spreads refer to the difference between the yields of 
sovereign bonds and non-sovereign bonds with the same maturity (Sun and Yan, 2012). 
Fluctuations in credit spreads represent changes in the supply of funds provided by financial 
intermediaries and reflect the general equilibrium of financial markets and economies 
(Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012).13    However, fluctuations in credit spreads can also be 
attributed to an amalgam of liquidity premiums, the tax treatment of corporate bonds and 
default risks, which limits the effectiveness of credit spreads as a proxy for financial market 
disequilibria (Sun and Yan, 2012).  
 
Sovereign bond yield spreads are the differences between the yields of sovereign bonds in 
different countries with varying credit ratings. High sovereign bond yield spreads reflect high 
default risks, low bond market liquidity and changing risk preferences due to financial market 
and economic uncertainty (Afonso, et al., 2012). The main limitation of sovereign bond yield 
spreads is that they do not significantly reflect conditions prior to financial market imbalances 
(Afonso, et al., 2012).  
 
                                                     
13 A spike in credit spreads indicate that financial intermediaries have inadequate capital and reduce their supply 
of credit as a result, which increases the cost of debt financing and widens credit spreads (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 
2012).  
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The debt-to-GDP ratio is the ratio between sovereign debt and GDP, and it is a common 
indicator for default risk. High debt-to-GDP ratios usually suggest that the growth rate of debt 
exceeds the growth rate of GDP, which may induce a recession caused by fiscal 
unsustainability.  However, high debt-to-GDP ratios do not necessarily indicate financial 
market imbalances (Ostry, et al., 2010). 
 
Based on observations of robust methodology in existing literature, the current study uses credit 
spreads as a proxy for financial market disequilibria. Credit spreads indicate the severity of 
financial market disequilibria and economic recessions, and the relationship between credit 
spreads and economic variables holds over varying financial and economic conditions 
(Krishnamurthy and Muir, 2015). Details about the changes in credit spreads for each of the 21 
sample countries is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
 
To ensure that credit spreads are an appropriate proxy for imbalances in financial markets, a 
VAR Analysis was conducted to examine the short-term relationship between credit spreads 
and the returns of key financial markets: stock, bond, foreign exchange and oil markets (in line 
with Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012). Furthermore, two lag lengths will be used based on the 
suggestions of Jones (2014). A condition for this study is that there must be a relationship 
between credit spreads and the returns of at least one key market for each country in order for 
credit spreads to be used as a proxy. For each of the selected countries, the results of the VARs 
indicated that there is a statistically significant short-term relationship between changes in 
credit spreads and the returns of at least one key financial market. Based on the VAR Analysis, 
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it can be concluded that credit spreads primarily reflect equilibrium in bond, foreign exchange 
and oil markets.14  
 
3.2 Evaluating Macroeconomic Policies 
Based on the postulations of Makin (2013)15, the efficacy of government spending in resolving 
financial market disequilibria and stimulating the economy will be evaluated by using a VAR 
Analysis and a Linear Regression Analysis. The models will examine the short-term and 
underlying impact of government spending on credit spreads, market interest rates, GDP, 
consumption and investment. In line with Makin (2013), this study will consider two lag 
lengths in the VAR Analysis. Following equations will be used:  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
𝑀𝑀 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 +  𝜀𝜀 
(1) 
 
Where ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the change in credit spreads; MIR is the market interest rate; GDP is the Gross 
Domestic Product; C is consumption; I is investment; GS is government spending; and 𝜀𝜀 is the 
error term.  
 
                                                     
14 These results are consistent with the propositions of Jones (2014). The results of the VAR Analysis are available 
upon request.  
15 Makin (2013) investigated the macroeconomic policy effectiveness of increased government spending within a 
two-sector open economy framework based on two distinct classes of goods and services – tradables and non-
tradables. The results suggest that increased government spending on both tradables and non-tradables is 
ineffective (or ambiguous) in influencing national output or employment. Consistent with the methodological 
approach of Makin (2013), the current study employs VAR analysis. 
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Furthermore, in line with Cenesizoglu and Essid (2010), both a VAR Analysis and a Linear 
Regression Analysis will be conducted to evaluate the effects of liquidity provision on credit 
spreads and the efficacy of central bank interest rates in mitigating financial market 
disequilibria. Additionally, Cenesizoglu and Essid (2010) posited that changes to credit spreads 
might be due to the lack of control variables. Hence, both uncontrolled and controlled Linear 
Regression Analyses will be conducted. The equations being tested are as follows: 
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝜀𝜀 
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑟𝑟10 + 𝛽𝛽3(∆𝑟𝑟10)2 + 𝛽𝛽4∆(𝑟𝑟10 −  𝑟𝑟2) +  𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀 
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑟𝑟10 + 𝛽𝛽3(∆𝑟𝑟10)2 + 𝛽𝛽4∆(𝑟𝑟10 −  𝑟𝑟2) +  𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 +  𝜀𝜀 
(2) 
Where ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the change in credit spreads; 𝛽𝛽0 is the constant or intercept term;𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, 𝛽𝛽3, 𝛽𝛽4 
and 𝛽𝛽5 are the coefficients; LP is liquidity provision; CBIR is central bank interest rates; 𝑟𝑟10 is 
the yield on ten-year sovereign bonds; 𝑟𝑟2 is the yield on two-year sovereign bonds; 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 is the 
returns on the leading stock market in each country; 𝜀𝜀 is the error term. 
 
3.3 Investigating the Influence of the Political Landscape 
In order to evaluate the influence of the political landscape on macroeconomic policy 
frameworks designed to regress financial market imbalances, a Country-by-Country Analysis, 
One-Way ANOVA Test, Correlation Analysis and a Logit Regression Analysis will be 
employed, following the propositions of Sundquist (2011). First, a Country-by-Country 
Analysis will be used to identify the political orientations of each of the selected countries and 
they will be classified as left-wing, centrist or right-wing. Then, as suggested by Sundquist 
(2011), a One-Way Anova Test will be conducted to determine if governments with the same 
political orientations across the selected countries implemented similar macroeconomic 
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policies during periods of financial market disequilibria. A One-Way Anova Test will also be 
used to evaluate the notion of policy convergence, which is in line with Samuels and Shugart 
(2011). A Correlation Analysis will be conducted to observe the correlation between political 
orientations and macroeconomic policies for each of the selected countries. Finally, a Logit 
Regression Analyses will be conducted to elucidate the macroeconomic policies chosen by 
governments with various political orientations to redress financial market imbalances, which 
is in line with Song (2010). The dependent dummy variables represent macroeconomic policies 
implemented during periods of financial market disequilibria. In order to create the dependent 
dummy variables, changes in credit spreads that are above or equal to 0.01 will be assigned the 
value of 1 and all others will be assigned the value of 0, as suggested by Jones (2014). This 
index will then be multiplied by government spending, liquidity provision and central bank 
interest rates. As for the independent dummy variables, 1 will denote that the government in 
office follows the political orientation being analysed and 0 will denote that the government 
does not16. The dependent variable calculation and regression models are as follows: 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 =  𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 ×  ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥≥0.01 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
(3) 
Where 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 is the dummy variables created for government spending, liquidity provision and 
central bank interest rates, respectively; 𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺 is macroeconomic policies (government spending, 
liquidity provision and central bank interest rates); ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥≥0.01 is changes in credit spreads that 
                                                     
16 Political orientations were obtained from the Election Resources database and then were confirmed with 
government reports from the selected countries. 
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are above or equal to 0.01; 𝛽𝛽0 is the constant or intercept term; 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is government spending 
during financial market disequilibria; 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is liquidity provision during financial market 
disequilibria; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is central bank interest rates during financial market disequilibria; 𝛽𝛽1 
is the coefficient; 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 is the dummy variables for the political orientations of governments, 
representing left-wing, centre and right-wing; 𝜀𝜀 is the error term.  
 
3.4 Examining the Impact of Global Financial Integration 
In order to evaluate the influence of global financial integration on the macroeconomic policies 
chosen to mitigate financial market imbalances, this study will employ the Covered Interest 
Rate Parity as a proxy, a Logit Regression Analysis and a One-Way ANOVA Test, based on 
the propositions of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) and Cheung and de Haan (2013). The 
dependent dummy variables will be the same index used in 3.3. Regarding the Independent 
dummy variables for the Logit Regression, 0 will denote significant violations of the Covered 
Interest Rate Parity and 1 will denote minor or non-existent violations.17 Moreover, the United 
States Dollar (USD) will be used as the base currency since many countries use the USD as a 
conventional home currency or peg (Krishnakumar, 2015). A One-Way ANOVA Test will then 
be used to evaluate the notion of policy harmonisation across countries during periods of 
financial market imbalances. The Covered Interest Rate Parity condition and the regression 
models are as follows:  
 
𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡
=  𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡
�
1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡
1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡
� 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 +  𝜀𝜀 
                                                     
17 Since violations in the Covered Interest Rate Parity occur frequently when quarterly data is used, Jones (2014) 
suggested that violations above or equal to 0.01 should be viewed as low global financial integration and all other 
minor or non-existent violations represent high global financial integration.  
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 +  𝜀𝜀 
 
(4) 
Where 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡
 is the forward exchange rate of currency A and currency B; 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡
 is the spot 
exchange rate of currency A and currency B; 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 is the interest rate for borrowing in currency 
A; 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 is the interest rate for borrowing in currency B;  𝛽𝛽0 is the constant or intercept term; 
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is government spending during financial market disequilibria; 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is liquidity 
provision during financial market disequilibria; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is central bank interest rates during 
financial market disequilibria; 𝛽𝛽1 is the coefficient; 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 is the dummy variables for global 
financial integration and 𝜀𝜀 is the error term.  
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics to provide a general review of the premier data used 
in this study for the 21 selected countries, namely changes in the following macroeconomic 
variables: government spending, liquidity provision and interest rates.  
 
A visual inspection of Table 1 reveals that all of the selected countries have positive and 
negative changes in government spending, liquidity provision and interest rates. The average 
change in government spending was positive for all of the selected countries except for 
Netherlands and Poland.18 Sweden had the highest average change in government spending of 
36%, and all other countries with the exception of Netherlands and Poland had changes in 
government spending ranging from 0.3% to 9.5%. Sweden also has the highest standard 
                                                     
18 Brady and Lee (2014) postulated that government spending declined from 1971 to 2008 in many countries such as Netherlands and Poland 
due to depleted government resources and parliamentary votes against significant expansionary policies.  
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deviation, which indicates instances of significant changes in government spending away from 
the mean. 
 
Canada was observed to have the only negative average change in liquidity provision and also 
reported the highest standard deviation.19 On the other hand, Taiwan has the highest average 
change in liquidity provision as well as the highest standard deviation.20   
 
With regards to interest rates, 18 countries reported a negative average changes in interest rates.  
This indicates that most of the selected countries have responded to macroeconomic 
disequilibria by lowering interest rates. Only Norway, Singapore and Switzerland have average 
changes in interest rates close to 0%, which indicates that interest rates have been relatively 
constant over time. Norway also has highest standard deviation relative to changes in interest 
rates. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2 The Effectiveness of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Resolving Financial Market 
Disequilibria 
The first aim of this study evaluates the efficacy of macroeconomic policies implemented to 
resolve financial market disequilibria by examining the impact of government spending, 
liquidity provision, and interest rate policies on credit spreads.  
 
                                                     
19 A negative average change in liquidity provision may indicate that liquidity provision has been constant for a significant amount of time, 
with any changes being reductions in liquidity provision. 
20 This reflects quantitative easing in Taiwan, which regards the creation of money by central banks in order to provide liquidity to financial 
intermediaries (Kang, 2015). 
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In evaluating the effectiveness of government spending in reducing credit spreads over time, 
the results of the Linear Regression Analysis indicate that government spending does not 
impact credit spreads for any of the selected countries at a significance level 5% level. As for 
the short-term relationship between credit spreads and government spending, changes in 
government spending significantly influenced changes in credit spreads for only 3 of the 
selected countries, namely Canada, Norway and Poland as seen in Table 2. For Canada, the 
second lag of changes in government spending influenced changes in credit spreads with a 
coefficient of -34.0421. Similarly, for Norway, the first lag of changes in government spending 
influenced changes in credit spreads with a coefficient of -10.05. Finally, the second lag of 
changes in government spending in Poland influenced changes in credit spreads with a 
coefficient of 0.33. Since only 3 of the selected countries indicate a significant relationship 
between government spending and credit spreads, hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. As such, 
these results strongly support hypothesis 1. These results suggest that governments should not 
implement government spending as a tool to facilitate stability in financial markets.  
 
A central contention of theoretical analyses of fiscal policies is that prudent government 
spending which does not exacerbate public debt serves to mitigate uncertainty in the economy, 
which helps reduce risk premia and credit spreads (Hairault, et al., 2012). However, one 
particular limitation of government spending is the inherent lag in its implementation 
(Kobayashi, 2013).  Designing government spending policies takes considerable time, which 
limits its effect on consumer confidence. Furthermore, the government budget constraint can 
also retard the responsiveness and efficacy of government spending (Alesina and Ardagna, 
2009). 
                                                     
21 In other words, a one-unit increase in government spending reduces changes in credit spreads by 34.04 in 
Canada. 
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[Insert Table 2 and 3 about here] 
 
Furthermore, the results of the linear regression analyses indicate that changes in government 
spending influence interest rates, GDP, consumption and investment for some of the selected 
countries. In the market interest rates analysis, changes in government spending only 
influenced changes in interest rates for Malaysia, as seen in Table 3. Although these results 
indicate that an increase government spending reduces market interest rates, the R-squared 
value of this model is quite low, suggesting that numerous other factors contribute to the 
reduction in interest rates22. Hence, in Malaysia, government expenditure is a viable 
macroeconomic policy in stimulating the economy by reducing market interest rates, which 
facilitates borrowing. Only 4 of the selected countries: Malaysia, China, South Africa and 
France, demonstrated that government spending impacts GDP. An increase in government 
spending causes an increase in GDP in Malaysia, China and South Africa, while an increase in 
government spending reduced GDP in France.23 However, only Malaysia and China have 
reliable regression results based on the R-squared measure. As such, though government 
spending may stimulate GDP in Malaysia and China, this policy may not be effective in the 
other selected countries. 
 
The regression analysis of the impact of changes in government spending on changes in 
consumption had statistically significant results for the United Kingdom, Australia, Hong 
                                                     
22 With a coefficient of -0.040, a one-unit increase in government spending reduces changes in market interest 
rates by 0.040. However, the R-squared value indicates that only 15.4% of the variance of the regression model 
is explained by government spending.  
23 A 1-unit increase in government expenditure causes changes in GDP to increase in Malaysia, China and South 
Africa by 0.083, 0.248 and 0.156, respectively. In contrast, the regression model for France indicates that a 1-unit 
increase in government spending reduces GDP changes by 0.292. This reflects the ‘crowding out’ effect and 
Furceri and Sousa (2011) found similar results. 
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Kong, France and Austria, as shown in Table 3. Of these countries, only Australia indicated a 
positive relationship between government expenditure and consumption. In contrast, 
government spending reduces consumption in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, France and 
Austria.24  However, the R-squared values are relatively low for this regression model.  
 
Regarding investment, 6 of the selected countries, namely the United States, Malaysia, South 
Korea, China, Brazil, and France, demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between 
government spending and investment, as seen in Table 3. All of these countries expect for the 
United States and France, demonstrated a positive relationship between government spending 
and investment.25 However, only the regression models of China and Brazil are sufficiently 
reliable, which suggests that government spending is an effective macroeconomic policy for 
stimulating investment in China and Brazil.  
 
In summary, government spending only has a statistically significant relationship with interest 
rates, GDP, consumption and investment for a small number of the selected countries, 
providing only limited support for hypothesis 2. Other studies such as Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2013) reached similar conclusions regarding the influence of government 
spending on market interest rates and private investment, while some studies such as Backmann 
and Sims (2012) found that government spending increases GDP and consumption. The effect 
of government spending on these variables ultimately depends on how markets react to a shock 
in government spending. Hence, though there is a relationship between financial markets and 
                                                     
24 A 1-unit increase in government expenditure reduces consumption in the United Kingdom, Hong, France and 
Austria by 0.197, 0.169, 0.268 and 4.199, respectively. Beyond the ‘crowding out’ effect, one explanation for 
these results is that additional government spending may be financed by an increase in taxes, which reduces 
disposable income and subsequently reduces consumption.  
25 A 1-unit increase in government spending increases changes in investment in Malaysia, South Korea, China 
and Brazil by 0.078, 0.6673, 0.217 and 0.779, respectively. In contrast, a 1-unit increase in government spending 
reduces changes in investment in the United States and France by 0.591 and 0.810, respectively. Hence, the United 
States and France demonstrate that government expenditure may not necessarily foster investor confidence.   
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the larger economy, there may not necessarily be transitivity amongst government spending, 
the economy, and financial markets, which limits the efficacy of fiscal policies as a stabilisation 
tool for financial markets. 
 
In evaluating the effect of liquidity provision on credit spreads, both uncontrolled and 
controlled regressions were conducted, which allows the real effects of liquidity provision to 
be elucidated by accounting for other exogenous variables that may impact credit spreads 
(Cenesizoglu and Essid, 2010). VARs were then conducted to analyse the short-term impact of 
liquidity provision on credit spreads.  
 
The results suggest that, for the uncontrolled regression, only Canada demonstrated a 
significant relationship between liquidity provision and credit spreads, with an increase in 
liquidity provision reducing credit spreads as seen in Table 4. Regarding the controlled 
regression, only Switzerland and Poland provide evidence to support the notion that liquidity 
provision has an impact on changes in credit spreads. For Switzerland, an increase in liquidity 
provision reduces changes in credit spreads; whereas, a reduction in liquidity provision reduces 
changes in credit spreads in Poland.  Nevertheless, the adjusted R-squared in Table 4 is low for 
both of these regression models, which suggests that the results may not be sufficiently reliable. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Regarding the short-term impact of changes in liquidity provision on changes in credit spreads, 
only China and Austria had statistically significant results.  For China, the results suggested a 
positive relationship between the first lag of changes in liquidity provision and changes in 
credit spreads (a coefficient of 0.441 and a standard error of 0.216).  Similarly, the regression 
results for Austria indicates that liquidity provision has a positive impact on credit spreads (a 
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coefficient of 9.778 and a standard error of 4.048).  These results suggest that liquidity 
provision may not be a suitable macroeconomic stabilising policy in the short-run as it may 
have destabilising effects26.  
 
In summary, the effects of liquidity provision on credit spreads were only statistically 
significant for 5 countries. Furthermore, these results indicate that liquidity provision may have 
destabilising effects and governments should reduce liquidity provision in order to resolve 
financial market disequilibria. Therefore, these results support hypothesis 3. This is consistent 
with Mishkin (2011) who argued that liquidity provision might actually increase systemic risk 
by encouraging excessive leveraging in the financial system, which is detrimental during 
periods of financial disequilibria. Fragmentation in the financial system also explains the 
ineffectiveness of liquidity provision in that financial intermediaries may be hesitant to lend or 
participant in the interbank market when financial market disequilibria place pressure on their 
liquidity ratios (Taylor and Williams, 2009). 
 
Similar to the analysis on the efficacy of liquidity provision, the analysis on the impact of 
central bank interest rates on credit spreads employed both uncontrolled and controlled 
regressions. In addition, VARs were then conducted to analyse the short-term impact of 
liquidity provision on credit spreads. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents the statistically significant results of the uncontrolled and controlled 
regression analysis of the impact of changes in central bank interest rates on changes in credit 
spreads. In the uncontrolled regression, seven of the selected countries, namely Australia, 
                                                     
26 This result is not presented in the Tables. 
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Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, South Korea, South Africa and Germany, show strong 
evidence to suggest that changes in central bank interest rates have a positive impact on changes 
in credit spreads.  Hence, a reduction in central bank interest rates reduces changes in credit 
spreads.  In contrast, the United States and Taiwan indicate that an increase in changes in 
central bank interest rates reduces credit spreads.  However, the only sufficiently reliable 
regression model is that of the United States based on the R-square. Regarding the controlled 
regression, seven of the selected countries show evidence to support the notion that central 
bank interest rates have a significant influence on credit spreads. The impact of central bank 
interest rates on credit spreads is positive for the majority of the sample countries, with South 
Africa having the highest change in credit spreads resulting from the adjustment of central bank 
interest rates.  
 
As for the short-term impact of central bank interest rates, Norway, China and South Africa 
show strong evidence to support the notion that changes in central bank interest rates impact 
changes in credit spreads (coefficients of 0.345, 0.423, 0.427 and a standard error of 2.24, 2.20, 
3.66, respectively)27.  These results indicate a positive relationship between central bank 
interest rates and credit spreads.  In summary, these results indicate that central bank interest 
rates should be reduced in order to decrease credit spreads and, ultimately, resolve financial 
market disequilibria. Essentially, a reduction in central bank interest rates facilitates lending 
operations and reduces volatility within financial markets (Censesizoglu and Essid, 2011). 
Though some of these regression models may not be sufficiently reliable, thirteen different 
countries indicate a significant relationship between central bank interest rates and credit 
spreads. Therefore, these results support hypothesis 4. These results are consistent with 
Woodford (2012) who suggested that increasing interest rates before imbalances materialise in 
                                                     
27 These results are not presented in the Tables. 
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financial markets significantly impedes excessive leveraging; and, lowering interest rates 
during periods of financial market disequilibria can mitigate funding inadequacies in the 
financial system. However, Gali (2013) found that proactive interest rate policies could 
exacerbate imbalances in financial markets by increasing volatility. Hence, reactive interest 
rate policies may be more optimal. Overall, the findings in this section provide strong support 
for hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 but limited support for hypothesis 2.28 
 
4.2 The Impact of Political Ideologies 
This subsection provides findings for the second aim of this study which was to elucidate the 
impact of the political orientation of government in office on the fiscal and monetary policies 
chosen to resolve financial market disequilibria.  
 
In elucidating the influence of left-wing and right-wing governments on the policymaking 
process, a One-Way ANOVA Test, a Logit Regression Analysis and a Correlation Analysis 
were employed as suggested in Section 3. Due to redundancies in the dummy variables, 
Singapore, Norway, Malaysia, China and Sweden were not included in the Logit Regression 
Analysis and Correlation Analysis.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 shows the statistically significant results of the One-Way ANOVA Test regarding 
macroeconomic policies implemented by governments based on their political orientation 
during periods of financial market disequilibria.  Regarding left-wing governments, there was 
no significant difference between countries in terms of the average change in government 
spending and liquidity provision administered when there were imbalances in financial 
                                                     
28 Details of individual country results are available upon request. 
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markets. Furthermore, right-wing governments of the selected countries implemented similar 
changes in government spending during periods of disequilibria in financial markets.  The 
results may allude to the inherent macroeconomic policy preferences of left-wing and right-
wing governments but may also suggest similarities in the government budget and central bank 
constraints. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 shows the Logit Regression and Correlation results of countries that demonstrated a 
statistically significant relationship between political orientations and macroeconomic policies 
implemented during periods of financial market disequilibria. During disequilibria in financial 
markets, the United States and Brazil demonstrate that left-wing governments reduce 
government spending; whereas, right-wing governments increase government spending.29 
Regarding liquidity provision, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland indicate that left-
wing governments increase liquidity provision, while right-wing governments decrease 
liquidity provision.30 In contrast, Brazil and Taiwan indicate that left-wing governments reduce 
liquidity provision and right-wing governments increase liquidity provision. As for interest 
rates, only France provides evidence to support the notion that left-wing governments reduce 
interest rates and right-wing governments increase interest rates.31 Indeed, these models may 
not be sufficiently reliable because the R-squared values are relatively low. 
                                                     
29 An increase in government spending is proactive in nature because it directly stimulates consumption and 
investment and it fosters confidence during financial market disequilibria and recessions (Bachmann and Sims, 
2012; Auerback and Gorodnichenko, 2013). Whereas, a reduction in government spending is a reactive 
macroeconomic policy as it inadvertently stimulates consumption and investment by improving the government 
budget balance, which reduces expectations of future increases in tax and interest rates (Cwik and Wieland, 2011; 
Ramey, 2012).  
30 An increase in liquidity provision is a proactive macroeconomic policy because it improves funding shortfalls 
in the financial system, facilitates lending, reduces credit risk and causes a contraction in credit spreads 
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). 
31 A reduction in central bank interest rates is a proactive macroeconomic policy because it facilitates lending 
activities by lowering the cost of borrowing, which reduces volatility in financial markets (Cenesizoglu and Essid, 
2011). On the other hand, an increase in central bank interest rates indirectly improves financial market conditions 
by increasing sovereign bond yields and subsequently reducing credit spreads (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2011). 
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In summary, with regard to the selected countries, although left-wing governments 
implemented similar changes in government spending and liquidity provision and right-wing 
governments also administered similar changes in government spending, there is insufficient 
evidence to support the notion that left-wing governments have an inclination to choose 
proactive macroeconomic policies and right-wing governments have a tendency to choose 
reactive macroeconomic policies.  Therefore, the results suggest that there is limited support 
for hypothesis 5.  In contrast, Song (2010) found strong evidence supporting the notion that 
right-wing governments are more inclined to implement policies that are reactive in nature. 
The underlying premise is that right-wing governments tend to facilitate market solutions rather 
than intervene (Woodford, 2012). However, this view is not only held by right-wing 
governments but also proponents of classical and neoclassical economic theories which suggest 
that internal mechanisms such as the price system and wages ultimately facilitate equilibrium 
in economies so government intervention should be limited (Aspromourgos, 2012). As such, 
left-wing and centrist governments may also hold this perspective. 
In evaluating the influence of centrist governments on the policymaking process, a One-Way 
ANOVA Test, a Logit Regression Analysis and a Correlation Analysis were used. Regarding 
the selected countries, only Japan, Netherlands and Poland had radical centrist governments at 
any point within the study period. The results in Table 6 indicate that centrist governments in 
Japan, Netherlands and Poland implemented similar changes in government spending and 
central bank interest rates. These results suggest that centre governments may inherently prefer 
government spending and central bank interest rates as macroeconomic policies to redress 
financial market imbalances, but numerous other factors such as automatic fiscal stabilisers32 
can cause similarities in macroeconomic policies.  
                                                     
32 Automatic stabilisers are policies that automatically adjust to economic conditions (Veld, et al., 2012).  
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Regarding the influence of centrist governments on the choice of macroeconomic policies 
implemented to resolve financial market disequilibria, only Netherlands provided evidence that 
there is a significant relationship between centrist governments and macroeconomic policies; 
specifically that centrist governments have an inclination to increase liquidity provision in 
order to mitigate imbalances in financial markets. However, based on its R-squared value 
(6.6%) the result was deemed not reliable33. 
 
In summary, though the centrist governments of Japan, Netherlands and Poland implemented 
similar changes in government expenditure and central bank interest rates, there is inadequate 
evidence to ascertain whether or not centre governments are inherently responsive to financial 
market disequilibria. Therefore, there is limited support for hypothesis 6. Moreover, radical 
centrism is uncommon, with only three of the twenty-one selected countries having radical 
centre governments between 1993 and 2015. 
 
The notion of policy convergence across political orientations was evaluated by employing a 
One-Way Anova Test between left-wing, centrist and right-wing governments relative to 
macroeconomic policies implemented during periods of financial market disequilibria.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 8 shows that results of the One-Way Anova Test used to determine whether or not there 
were similarities in the macroeconomic policies implemented by left-wing, centrist and right-
wing governments when there were imbalances in financial markets. These results provide 
                                                     
33 This result is not presented in the Tables. 
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strong support for the notion of policy convergence during financial market disequilibria, as 
there were no significant differences in changes in government spending, liquidity provision 
and interest rates across the selected countries. Hence, governments implemented similar 
macroeconomic policies irrespective of political orientations. Therefore, there is strong support 
for hypothesis 7.  These results are consistent with Samuels and Shugart (2011) and Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2013) who found that governments with different political orientations tend to 
implement similar policies when trying to mitigate financial market disequilibria. As such, 
macroeconomic policy paradigms for resolving financial market disequilibria are not 
necessarily determined by political orientations (Crawford, 2011). Overall, the results in this 
section provide strong support for hypotheses 7 and limited support for hypotheses 5 and 6.34 
 
4.3 The Influence of Global Financial Integration 
This subsection provides findings for the third aim of this study, which regards the influence 
of global financial integration on the macroeconomic policies chosen to redress financial 
market imbalances.  
 
The influence of global financial integration on government spending during financial market 
imbalances was evaluated by conducting a Logit Regression Analysis. Since the dummy 
variables of Hong Kong and China were redundant, these countries were not included in this 
analysis. For this analysis, none of the 21 selected countries demonstrated that there is a 
significant relationship between global financial integration and government spending. This 
suggests that governments do not increase or decrease government spending when there is a 
high degree of global financial integration.  Therefore, the results suggest that there is strong 
                                                     
34 A table indicating the political ideologies of the selected countries and all results of the various analyses are 
available upon request from the authors.  
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support for hypothesis 835. However, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) found that global 
financial integration usually causes governments to increase expenditure when there are 
imbalances in financial markets or economic recessions. The underlying premise is that 
governments try to supplement beneficial fiscal policy spillovers from countries resulting from 
a high degree of global financial integration (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013). For 
instance, expansionary fiscal policies in one country may increase foreign investment in 
another country if there is a high degree of global financial integration with negligible or 
limited capital controls. Indeed, disparities between this study and that of Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2013) are primarily due to their exclusion of countries with? erratic 
government spending. 
 
The influence of global financial integration on liquidity provision during financial market 
disequilibria was also examined by employing a Logit Regression Analysis, with Hong Kong 
and China not included in this analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
The results of the Logit Regression in Table 9 regarding the relationship between global 
financial integration and liquidity provision suggest that only the United Kingdom, the United 
States, South Korea and Taiwan showed strong evidence to support the notion that global 
financial integration influences liquidity provision. Both the United Kingdom and Taiwan 
indicate that governments tend to increase liquidity provision when there is a high degree of 
global financial integration in order to resolve financial market disequilibria.36 In contrast, the 
                                                     
35 This result is not presented in the paper. 
36 During financial market disequilibria, the credit supply of the global interbank market is limited, which 
exacerbates funding shortfalls for financial intermediaries that rely on this market (Iyer, et al., 2013). As such, 
governments may increase liquidity provision to mitigate these shortfalls.  
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United States and South Korea demonstrate that global financial integration leads governments 
to reduce liquidity provision during financial market imbalances.37 However, the only 
moderately reliable model is that of South Korea. Nevertheless, the notion that global financial 
integration influences liquidity provision is only supported by a small number of the selected 
countries. Therefore there is only limited support for hypothesis 9.  
 
A Logit Regression Analysis was also conducted to evaluate the influence of global financial 
integration on adjustments in central bank interest rates, with Hong Kong and China also being 
excluded from this analysis. The statistically significant results of the Logit Regression 
Analysis showed that only Poland out of the 21 countries studied indicated a significant 
relationship between global financial integration and central bank interest rates. Since only one 
country supports the notion that global financial integration influences central banks to reduce 
credit spreads, there is no support for hypothesis 1038. Mishkin (2009) also found that global 
financial integration does not influence interest rate policies. Rather than directly influencing 
interest rate policies implemented during financial market disequilibria, global financial 
integration may influence the effects of interest rates on financial markets and economies 
(Mishkin, 2009). As such, monetary policies are likely to be determined by more endogenous 
factors such as price stability (Mishkin, 2009). 
 
Finally, in evaluating the notion of global financial integration inducing policy harmonisation 
during periods of financial market disequilibria, a One-Way Anova Test was conducted which 
determines whether or not there were significant differences in macroeconomic policies 
implemented by governments across the selected countries.  
                                                     
37 Fecht et al. (2012) and Rey (2015) alluded to the fact that liquidity leakages are prominent in countries that 
have a high degree of global financial integration, which suggests the United Kingdom and Taiwan have increased 
liquidity provision to circumvent liquidity leakages. 
38 This result is not presented in the paper. 
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[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
The results of Table 10 indicate that there were significant differences in the average changes 
in government spending, liquidity provision and central bank interest rates implemented by 
governments as stabilisation policies when there were high degrees of global financial 
integration. This suggests that governments are generally autonomous when designing and 
implementing macroeconomic policies to resolve financial market imbalances. Therefore, 
these results provide strong evidence against hypothesis 11. Fiscal policies such as government 
spending are often determined by economic cycles and the government budget constraint, 
which influence the level of tax revenues and the availability of funding for governments (Gali, 
2013). Indeed, countries with high degrees of global financial integration may have different 
economic cycles that require different levels of government spending. Moreover, monetary 
policies are often based on targets set for inflation rates, interest rates, and three-month Libor 
rates, which differ across countries (Gali, 2013). In addition, central banks that have 
insufficient capital may not be able to implement extraordinary measures such as the Term 
Auction Facility in the United States during periods of financial market disequilibria (Stella, 
2009). As such, macroeconomic policies implemented to resolve financial market disequilibria 
are likely to be different across countries even if there is a high degree of global financial 
integration. Overall, the findings of this study provide strong support for hypotheses 8, limited 
support for hypotheses 9, no support for hypothesis 10 and strong support against hypothesis 
11.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The 2008 Financial Crisis is a supreme example of the cataclysmic effects resulting from 
financial market disequilibria that are not effectively resolved by governments39. However, the 
task of identifying the role of macroeconomic policies in supplementing macroprudential 
regulation has been relatively elusive due to uncertainty regarding the efficacy of fiscal and 
monetary policies (Pasquariello, 2014). The findings of the first objective help to elucidate an 
effective policy framework for governments and monetary authorities to implement in efforts 
to resolve financial market disequilibria. While some studies such as Delong et al. (2012) gave 
credence to government spending as a stabilisation tool, other studies such as Woodford (2010) 
posited that government spending is more effective at increasing GDP and private investment. 
This study provides further clarity on the efficacy of government spending, postulating that 
governments should abstain from increasing expenditure during periods of financial market 
disequilibria because this expansionary policy does not effectively resolve imbalances in 
financial markets. Moreover, government spending during periods of financial market 
disequilibria has negligible effects on interest rates, GDP, consumption, and private 
investment. Disequilibria in financial markets limit credit availability and increase risk premia, 
making it more difficult for governments to finance their deficits (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009). 
Hence, government spending during these periods may have destabilising effects. As such, 
governments should maintain prudent expenditure when there are financial market 
disequilibria as a more balanced budget may foster confidence in financial markets. As for 
monetary policies, interest rates should be the primary stabilisation tool of monetary authorities 
while liquidity provision should be secondary within their policy framework. Central to this 
                                                     
39 See, for instance, Taylor (2009) and Tanzi (2015) for a comprehensive review concerning macroeconomic 
policies and financial crisis. 
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proposition is the notion that the efficacy of liquidity provision is determined by the degree of 
cohesion within financial markets. Fragmented financial markets retard the efficacy of liquidity 
provision in resolving financial market disequilibria (Taylor and Williams, 2009). It is 
imperative that monetary authorities first evaluate the intrinsic structure or cohesion of 
financial markets before injecting liquidity, but this may limit the responsiveness of monetary 
authorities to financial market disequilibria.  On the other hand, interest rate policies may be 
relatively more effective in resolving financial market disequilibria. Based on the findings of 
this study and propositions of Mishkin (2011) and Gali (2013), interest rates should be reduced 
after financial market disequilibria materialise rather than increased before imbalances 
develop. Therefore, a synthesis of prudent government spending, conditional liquidity 
provision and reduced interest rates may effectively resolve financial market disequilibria. 
 
The findings of the second and third aims of this study are more pertinent to market participants 
such as households and investors as they help to mitigate uncertainty regarding the choices 
governments make relative to the macroeconomic policies implemented to resolve financial 
market disequilibria. This study adds to existing knowledge on the influence of the political 
landscape throughout the policy-making process during periods of financial distress. Regarding 
the influence of the political landscape, studies such as Song (2010) suggested that right-wing 
governments have an inclination to maintain policy frameworks that are reactive in nature 
while left-wing governments take a more proactive stance in resolving financial market 
disequilibria. Contrary to the postulations of Song (2010), this study posits that political 
orientations do not influence governments’ choice of macroeconomic stabilisation policies. 
Rather, governments with different political ideologies are likely to implement similar policies 
during periods of financial market disequilibria. As such, partisan changes in governments do 
not necessarily change the paradigm of macroeconomic policies aimed at mitigating 
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imbalances in financial markets. Hence, market participants should not base consumption or 
investment bundles during financial market disequilibria on the political orientation of the 
government in office. When there are financial market disequilibria, market participants can 
expect newly elected governments with different political ideologies to follow prominent 
policy frameworks. As for global financial integration, many studies such as Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2013) and Feentra and Taylor (2014) suggested that a high degree of financial 
integration between countries leads governments to increase expenditure and liquidity 
provision during periods of financial market disequilibria. However, this study suggests that 
global financial integration does not influence the macroeconomic policies chosen to mitigate 
imbalances in financial markets. Furthermore, global financial integration does not cause 
countries to coordinate macroeconomic stabilisation policies. Hence, if capital controls are 
reduced or the degree of global financial integration increases, market participants should 
expect the macroeconomic policy framework for resolving financial market imbalances to 
remain the same. Therefore, there should be less uncertainty during financial market 
disequilibria if changes occur in the political landscape or in the degree of global financial 
integration.  
 
Overall, the results of this study elucidated the efficacy of macroeconomic policies in 
redressing financial market imbalances and provided insights on the influence of the political 
landscape and global financial integration of the policymaking process. This study has found 
that government spending does not significantly mitigate imbalances in financial markets and 
may have destabilising effects since it has a limited impact on market interest rates, GDP, 
consumption and investment. Furthermore, liquidity provision is also not an effective 
macroeconomic policy for facilitating stability within financial markets. However, this study 
has found that reductions in central bank interest rates significantly reduce credit spreads and 
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mitigate imbalances in financial market. As such, an appropriate policy framework would be 
prudent government spending, conditional liquidity provision, and a reduction in interest rates 
following the development of financial market disequilibria.  
 
As for the impact of the political landscape, this study has found that political orientations do 
not significantly influence the macroeconomic policies chosen to resolve financial market 
disequilibria. Instead, macroeconomic policies are likely to be the same across political 
orientations when there are financial market disequilibria. Moreover, this study shows strong 
evidence to support the notion that imbalances in financial markets cause policy convergence 
across political orientations. This study has also found that government spending, liquidity 
provision and central bank interest rates implemented during periods of financial market 
disequilibria may not be significantly influenced by global financial integration. Finally, this 
study has found strong evidence against the notion that financial market imbalances cause 
policy harmonisation across countries with high degrees of global financial integration.  
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Table 1: Changes in the following macroeconomic variables 
Country 
Government Spending Liquidity Provisions Interest rates 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Australia 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.012 -0.008 0.062 
Austria 0.004 0.009 0.010 0.019 -0.006 0.046 
Brazil 0.005 0.029 0.016 0.012 -0.008 0.049 
Canada 0.004 0.006 -0.024 0.224 -0.010 0.053 
China 0.041 0.493 0.038 0.042 -0.005 0.037 
France 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.022 -0.038 0.128 
Germany 0.003 0.009 0.012 0.014 -0.038 0.128 
Hong Kong 0.007 0.084 0.022 0.021 -0.002 0.036 
Japan 0.005 0.025 0.007 0.005 -0.012 0.083 
Malaysia 0.018 0.328 0.029 0.024 -0.006 0.025 
Netherlands -0.112 1.186 0.016 0.025 -0.035 0.200 
Norway 0.015 0.020 0.016 0.012 0.001 0.333 
Poland -0.015 0.606 0.022 0.023 -0.022 0.063 
Singapore 0.016 0.096 0.018 0.018 0.000 0.022 
South Africa 0.007 0.009 0.030 0.020 -0.006 0.054 
South Korea 0.010 0.010 0.026 0.017 -0.015 0.093 
Sweden 0.368 2.135 0.015 0.020 -0.026 0.172 
Switzerland 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.031 0.002 0.134 
Taiwan 0.095 0.267 0.096 0.233 -0.023 0.179 
United Kingdom 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.016 -0.019 0.121 
United States 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.016 -0.018 0.170 
Note: presents the mean (Mean), standard deviation (SD) for changes in government spending, liquidity 
provisions and interest rates for each of the selected countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Short-term Impact of Government Spending on Changes in Credit Spreads 
Country Lag Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic 
Canada Second -34.04 10.339 -3.293** 
Norway First -10.05 4.317 -2.328* 
Poland First 0.33 0.139 2.379* 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the regression equation (1) where the dependent variable is the change in 
Credit Spreads and the independent variable is Government Spending. * denotes significance at the 5% level 
whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: The Impact of Government Spending on Market Interest Rates, GDP, 
Consumption and Investment 
Variables Country R-Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared Constant Coefficient 
Interest rates Malaysia 0.154 0.143 -0.010* -0.040** 
(-2.37) (-3.72) 
GDP 
Malaysia 0.405 0.398 0.020** 0.083** (5.76) (7.74) 
China 0.876 0.874 0.023** 0.248** (4.77) (24.90) 
South Africa 0.059 0.048 0.006** 0.156* (8.68) (2.34) 
France 0.109 0.099 0.005** -0.292** (8.29) (-3.28) 
Consumption 
United 
Kingdom 0.084 0.073 
0.013** -0.197** 
(16.35) (-2.84) 
Australia 0.059 0.049 0.007** 0.084* (9.48) (2.36) 
Hong Kong 0.089 0.078 0.01 -0.169** (1.97) (-2.93) 
France 0.071 0.06 0.005** -0.268* (7.40) (-2.59) 
Austria 0.046 0.035 0.014 -4.199* (0.69) (-2.05) 
Investment 
United States 0.05 0.04 
0.013** -0.591* 
(5.77) (-2.17) 
Malaysia 0.079 0.068 
0.014 0.078** 
(1.47) (2.74) 
South Korea 0.059 0.048 
0.010* 0.663* 
(12.38) (-2.35) 
China 0.831 0.829 
0.029** 0.217** 
(5.59) (20.83) 
Brazil 0.712 0.709 
0.002 0.779** 
(0.14) (14.75) 
France 0.158 0.148 
0.006** -0.810** 
(4.60) (-4.06) 
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Note: This table presents the results of the regression equation (1) where the dependent variables are Market 
Interest Rates (MIR), GDP, Consumption (C) and Investments (I), respectively whilst the independent variable is 
Government Spending. * denotes significance at the 5% level whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. T-
Statistic is within parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Underlying Impact of Liquidity Provision on Changes in Credit Spreads 
Type of Regression Country R-Squared Adj. R-Squared Coefficient 
Uncontrolled Canada 0.157 0.137 -0.322*  (0.13) 
Controlled 
Switzerland 0.161 0.098 -1.289**  (-2.79) 
Poland 0.186 0.095 6.405* (2.17) 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the regression equation (2) where the dependent variable is the change 
in Credit Spreads and the independent variable is Liquidity Provisions. * denotes significance at the 5% level 
whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. T-Statistic is within parentheses. 
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Table 5: The Underlying Impact of Changes in Central Bank Interest Rates on Changes 
in Credit Spreads 
Type of Regression Country R-Squared Adj. R-Squared Coefficient 
Uncontrolled 
Australia 0.166 0.147 1.872**  (4.064) 
United States 0.308 0.292 -1.074**  (-6.035) 
Singapore 0.059 0.037 3.285* (2.263) 
Hong Kong 0.177 0.158 4.262** (3.897) 
Canada 0.157 0.137 0.566* (2.147) 
South Korea 0.071 0.050 0.635* (2.545) 
South Africa 0.083 0.062 3.997* (2.246) 
Taiwan 0.068 0.047 -1.286* (-2.529) 
Germany 0.093 0.072 0.549* (2.485) 
Controlled 
Australia 0.200 0.142 2.277**  (3.933) 
United States 0.416 0.374 -0.826**  (-4.060) 
Hong Kong 0.212 0.120 4.423**  (3.057) 
China 0.313 0.219 2.316**  (3.268) 
South Africa 0.445 0.404 7.731**  (5.117) 
 
Taiwan 0.166 0.099 1.461**  (-2.750) 
Germany 0.125 0.062 0.584*  (2.487) 
 
Note: This table presents the results of the regression equation (2) where the dependent variable is the change in 
Credit Spreads and the independent variable is central bank interest rates. * denotes significance at the 5% level 
whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. T-Statistic is within parentheses. 
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Table 6: Mean Comparison of Macroeconomic Policies based on Left-Wing and Right-
Wing Governments 
 
Political 
Orientatio
n 
Policy Sum of Squares 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square F Ratio 
Significanc
e Level 
Left 
Government 
Spending 0.187 20 0.009 0.460 0.980 
Liquidity 
Provision 0.279 20 0.014 0.653 0.874 
Right Government Spending 1.207 20 0.060 1.296 0.170 
Centre 
Government 
Spending 0.063 2 0.032 0.193 0.825 
Liquidity 
Provision 0.023 2 0.011 2.019 0.135 
 
Notes: The table details the analysis of variance results of macroeconomic policies implemented by governments 
based on their political orientation. F-ration denotes significance of the F-ratio. 
 
 
 
Table 7: The Underlying Influence of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Governments on the 
Policymaking Process 
Country Policy R-Squared Constant Coefficient Correlation 
United 
Kingdom Liquidity Provision 0.204 
0.007** 
(2.905) 
0.015** 
(4.743) 0.451** 
Australia Liquidity Provision 0.065 0.017** (10.416) 
0.006* 
(2.475) 0.255* 
United States Government Spending 0.095 
0.006** 
(4.367) 
-0.005** 
(-3.035) -0.308** 
Brazil 
Government 
Spending 0.051 
0.145** 
(4.052) 
-0.122* 
(-2.176) -0.226* 
Liquidity Provision 0.052 0.142** (4.499) 
-0.107* 
(-2.186) -0.227* 
Taiwan Liquidity Provision 0.105 0.019** (12.563) 
-0.008** 
(-3.210) -0.324** 
France Interest Rates 0.097 -0.026 (-1.198) 
-0.147** 
(-3.083) -0.312** 
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Poland Liquidity Provision 0.004 0.025** (4.747) 
0.003 
(0.568) 0.303** 
 
Note: This table presents the results of the correlation analysis and regression equation (3) where the dependent 
variable is Government Spending (GS), Liquidity Provision (LP) and Central Bank Interest Rates (CBIR) during 
Financial Market Disequilibria and the independent variable is the political orientation of governments. * denotes 
significance at the 5% level whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. T-Statistic is within parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Policy Convergence across Political Orientations 
Policy Sum of Squares 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Square F Ratio 
Significance 
Level 
Government 
Spending 0.093 2 0.046 1.098 0.334 
Liquidity 
Provision 0.076 1 0.076 3.535 0.06 
Interest Rates 541.147 1610 0.336 0.844 1 
 
Notes: The table details the analysis of variance results to evaluate the notion of policy convergence. F-ration 
denotes significance of the F-ratio. 
 
 
 
Table 9: The Influence of Global Financial Integration on Liquidity Provision 
 
Country R-Squared Constant Coefficient 
United Kingdom 0.068 0.012** (5.480) 
0.009* 
(2.539) 
United States 0.064 0.014** (7.594) 
-0.011* 
(-2.459) 
South Korea 0.209 0.034** (12.495) 
-0.016** 
(-4.825) 
Taiwan 0.054 0.007 (1.723) 
0.010* 
(2.250) 
 
Note: This table presents the results of the regression equation (4) where the dependent variable is Changes 
in Liquidity Provision (LP) during Financial Market Disequilibria and the independent variable is Global 
Financial Integration (GFI). * denotes significance at the 5% level whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% 
level. T-Statistic is within parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Policy Harmonisation 
Policy Sum of Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom Mean Square F Ratio 
Significance 
Level 
Government 
Spending 4.853 20 0.243 3.918 0.000 
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Liquidity 
Provision 0.781 20 0.039 7.976 0.000 
Interest 
Rates 8.249 20 0.412 13.603 0.000 
 
Notes: The table details the analysis of variance results to evaluate the notion of policy harmonisation. F-
ration denotes significance of the F-ratio. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Changes in Credit Spreads 
 
Country Min Max Mean SD Skew Kurt 
Australia -1.815 3.157 0.070 0.748 1.06 4.57 
Austria -3.051 1.910 -0.040 0.579 -2.01 11.16 
Brazil -1.299 0.874 0.010 0.248 -1.02 11.22 
Canada -2.197 2.442 0.040 0.665 0.15 2.95 
China -0.397 0.272 -0.010 0.084 -0.95 6.58 
France -1.792 3.296 0.013 0.579 1.88 13.13 
Germany -2.996 1.897 -0.029 0.626 -1.44 7.80 
Hong Kong -0.934 1.580 0.020 0.398 0.69 3.63 
Japan -1.271 0.747 -0.022 0.316 -0.52 2.24 
Malaysia -0.773 0.554 -0.011 0.221 -0.89 2.12 
Netherlands -1.305 1.000 0.003 0.294 -0.85 5.94 
Norway -3.060 3.178 -0.008 0.712 0.56 10.50 
Poland -2.005 3.989 0.052 0.799 1.59 7.52 
Singapore -0.552 0.610 0.011 0.205 -0.23 1.30 
South Africa -0.282 0.219 -0.005 0.093 -0.76 1.12 
South Korea -1.906 1.705 -0.014 0.522 -0.33 3.36 
Sweden -0.652 0.655 -0.006 0.170 0.19 4.40 
Switzerland -1.758 2.416 -0.003 0.441 1.31 12.96 
Taiwan -3.258 3.664 0.035 1.089 0.16 3.70 
United Kingdom -1.409 2.125 0.021 0.424 0.83 7.68 
United States -1.682 1.681 -0.051 0.458 -0.69 4.59 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of changes in credit spreads for each of the 21 sample countries. 
The table provides the minimum (Min), maximum (Max), mean (Mean), standard deviation (SD), skewness. This 
table demonstrates that the changes in the credit spreads of the 21 selected countries are both positive and negative 
for each country, with the average change in credit spreads being positive for 10 of the selected countries. 
Regarding skewness, the changes in credit spreads of 10 of the selected countries are skew to the right whilst for 
kurtosis, 15 of the selected countries have kurtosis values higher than three.   
 
